

Hash Functions: Present State of the Art

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
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Outline

- Definitions
- Applications
- General Attacks
- Constructions
- Custom Designed Hash Functions
- Hash Functions Based on Block Ciphers
- Hash Functions Based on Algebraic Operations
- Conclusions

Hash functions (1)


are secure; they can be reduced to 2 classes based on linear transformations of variables. The properties of these 12 schemes with respect to weaknesses of the underlying block cipher are studied. The same approach can be extended to study keyed hash functions (MACs) based on block ciphers and hash functions based on modular arithmetic. Finally a new attack is presented on a scheme suggested by R. Merkle. This slide is now shown at the VI Spanish meeting on Information Security and Cryptology in a presentation on the state of hash functions.



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Hash functions (2)

cryptographic hash function



This talk: only MDCs (Manipulation Detection Codes), which are often called 'hash functions'

Informal definitions (1)

- no secret parameters
- x arbitrary length \Rightarrow fixed length n
- computation “easy”

One Way Hash Function (OWHF):

- preimage resistant: $\nexists h(x) \neq x'$ with $h(x) = h(x')$
- 2nd preimage resistant:
 $\nexists x, h(x) \neq x' (\neq x)$ with $h(x') = h(x)$

Collision Resistant Hash Function (CRHF) = OWHF +

- collision resistant:
 $\nexists x, x' (x' \neq x)$ with $h(x) = h(x')$.

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Informal definitions (2)

preimage resistant \nRightarrow 2nd preimage resistant

- take a preimage resistant hash function; add an input bit b and replace one input bit by the sum modulo 2 of this input bit and b

2nd preimage resistant \nRightarrow preimage resistant

- if h is OWHF, \bar{h} is 2nd preimage resistant but not preimage resistant

$$\bar{h}(X) = \begin{cases} 0 \| X & \text{if } |X| \leq n \\ 1 \| h(X) & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

collision resistant \Rightarrow 2nd preimage resistant

[Simon 98] one cannot derive collision resistance from ‘general’ preimage resistance

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Formal definitions: (2nd) preimage resistance

Notation: $\Sigma = \{0, 1\}$, $l(n) > n$

A **one-way** hash function H is a function with domain $D = \Sigma^{l(n)}$ and range $R = \Sigma^n$ that satisfies the following conditions:

- preimage resistance: let x be selected uniformly in D and let M be an adversary that on input $h(x)$ uses time $\leq t$ and outputs $M(h(x)) \in D$. For each adversary M ,

$$\Pr_{x \in D} \{h(M(h(x))) = h(x)\} < \epsilon.$$

Here the probability is also taken over the random choices of M .

- 2nd preimage resistance: let x be selected uniformly in $\Sigma^{l(n)}$ and let M' be an adversary that on input x uses time $\leq t$ and outputs $x' \in D$ with $x' \neq x$. For each adversary M' ,

$$\Pr_{x \in D} \{M'(x) = h(x)\} < \epsilon.$$

Here the probability is taken over the random choices of M' .

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Formal definitions: collision resistance

A **collision-resistant** hash function \mathcal{H} is a function family with domain $D = \Sigma^{l(n)}$ and range $R = \Sigma^n$ that satisfies the following conditions:

- (the functions h_S are preimage resistant and second preimage resistant)
- collision resistance: let F be a collision string finder that on input $S \in \Sigma^s$ uses time $\leq t$ and outputs either “?” or a pair $x, x' \in \Sigma^{l(n)}$ with $x' \neq x$ such that $h_S(x') = h_S(x)$. For each F ,

$$\Pr_S \{F(\mathcal{H}) \neq \text{“?”}\} < \epsilon.$$

Here the probability is also taken over the random choices of F .

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Further generalization: Rogaway-Shrimpton, FSE 2004

Consider a family of hash functions.

For (2nd) preimage resistance, one can choose the challenge (x) and/or the key that selects the function.

This gives three flavours:

- random challenge, random key (Pre and Sec)
- random key, fixed challenge (ePre and eSec – everywhere)
- fixed key, random challenge (aPre and aSec – always)

Complex relationship (see figure on next slide).

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Relation between definitions: Rogaway-Shrimpton




Figure 1: Summary of the relationships among seven notions of hash-function security. Solid arrows represent conventional implications, dotted arrows represent provisional implications (their strength depends on the relative size of the domain and range), and the lack of an arrow represents a separation.

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Applications

- digital signatures: performance and security
- information authentication: protect authenticity of hash result
- redundancy: hash result appended to data before encryption
- protection of passwords: preimage resistant
- confirmation of knowledge/commitment: OWHF/CRHF
- pseudo-random string generation/key derivation
- micropayments (e.g., micromint)
- construction of MACs, stream ciphers, block ciphers

note: collision resistance is not always necessary

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Related definitions: UOWH

UOWH or Universal One-Way Hash Function

(TCR: target collision resistant hash functions or eSec)

- generate message x (+ some state)
- choose a random key K
- target collision finder algorithm:
given $x, K, h()$ (+state), find $x' \neq x$ such that $h_K(x') = h_K(x)$

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General Attacks (1)

depend only on size of hash result; not on details of the algorithm

guess (2nd) preimage: $\text{value} = \frac{(\#\text{\$}) \cdot (\#\text{trials}) \cdot (\#\text{targets})}{2^n}$

infeasible if $n \geq 64 \dots 90$

avoid simultaneous attack on all targets:

parameterize ('tweak') hash function

collision: birthday attack (or square root attack) [Yuval'79]


- r variations on genuine message
- r variations on fraudulent message
- probability of a match: 63% for $r = \sqrt{2^n} = 2^{n/2}$

infeasible in 2005 if $n \geq 160$, but this is not sufficient for long-term security.

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Time-memory trade-off (2)

Consider the functional graph of f



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General Attacks (2): time-memory trade-off


multiple preimages of the same function [Hellman80]:

- $O(2^n)$ precomputation, $O(2^{2n/3})$ storage
- single inversion in time $O(2^{2n/3})$

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Time-memory trade-off (3)


Choose m different starting points and iterate for t steps



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Time-memory trade-off (4)

Use r variants of f by introducing the function g



result:

- precomputation: $t \cdot m \cdot r$
- memory: $m \cdot r$
- on-line inversion of f : $r \cdot t$

Good choice: $m = r = t = 2^{n/3}$, success probability 0.55

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Time-memory trade-off (5)

Reduce number of memory accesses: distinguished points or rainbow method [Rivest82], [Oechslin03]

Full cost [Wiener02, J. Cryptology]: product of number of components with the duration of their use (motivation: hardware = ALUs, memory chips, wires, switching elements)

Question: if an algorithm requires $\Theta(2^n)$ steps and $\Theta(2^n)$ memory, what is the full cost: $\Theta(2^{2n})$ or $\Theta(2^{3n/2})$? or $\Theta(2^n)$?

Answer: it depends on inherent parallelism and memory access rate

If $\Theta(2^{3n/5})$ keys are searched, the full cost per key decreases from $\Theta(2^n)$ to $\Theta(2^{2n/5})$.

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General Attacks (3): the birthday attack

Efficient implementations of the birthday attack

- very little memory: cycle finding algorithms
- full parallelism

Distinguished point:

e.g., starts with d 0 bits

Start from a distinguished point


and store distinguished points

$$l = c = (\pi/8) \cdot 2^{n/2}$$

$$\Theta(e2^{n/2} + e2^{d+1}) \text{ steps}$$

$$\Theta(n2^{n/2-d}) \text{ memory}$$

with e the cost of evaluating the function f



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Birthday attacks:

In practice 10 million \$ [van Oorschot-Wiener]

- $n = 128$: 5 hours in 2004
- $n = 160$: 37 years (with 2004 equipment)

Full cost [Wiener02]: $\Theta(en2^{n/2})$

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General Attacks (5)

attacker	invest-ment	tool	hash result			
			2nd preimage		collision	
			2006	2015	2006	2015
Pedestrian Hacker	\$400	FPGA	74	80	115	127
Small Business	\$10,000	FPGA	79	85	125	137
Corporate Department	\$300K	ASIC	90	96	147	159
Big Company	\$10M	ASIC	95	101	158	169
Intelligence Agency	\$300M	ASIC	100	106	162	174


Size of hash result to withstand a brute force 2nd preimage and collision attack during 1 year. For the 2nd preimage attack, it is assumed that 65,536 messages are attacked in parallel. Inspired by Blaze et al., 1996.

FPGA = Field Programmable Gate Array;

ASIC = Application Specific Integrated Circuit

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Construction (1): iterated hash function



unambiguous padding of input to multiple of block length
 divide input into blocks x_1, x_2, \dots, x_t

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Construction (2): relation between security $f-h$

iterating a compression function can make it less secure:

- trivial 2nd preimage/collision:
 replace IV by H_1 and delete the first message block x_1
- 2nd preimage attack for a message with t blocks:
 increases success probability with a factor of t
- fixed points: $f(H_{i-1}, x_i) = H_{i-1}$ can lead to trivial 2nd preimages or collisions

one possible solution: Merkle-Damgård strengthening

- fix IV and append input length in padding

cf. [Merkle, Crypto 89] and [Damgård, Crypto 89]

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Construction (3): relation between security $f-h$

[Damgård-Merkle 89]

Let f be a collision resistant function mapping l to n bits (with $l > n$).

- If the padding contains the length of the input string, and if f is preimage resistant, the iterated hash function h based on f will be a CRHF.
- If an unambiguous padding rule is used, the following construction will yield a CRHF ($l - n > 1$):
 $H_1 = f(H_0 \parallel 0 \parallel x_1)$ and $H_i = f(H_{i-1} \parallel 1 \parallel x_i)$ $i = 2, 3, \dots, t$.

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Construction (4): relation between security f - h

[Lai-Massey 92]

Assume that the padding contains the length of the input string, and that the message X (without padding) contains at least two blocks. Then finding a second preimage for h with a fixed IV requires 2^n operations iff finding a second preimage for f with arbitrarily chosen H_{i-1} requires 2^n operations.

BUT:

- very few hash functions have a strong compression function
- very few hash functions are designed based on a strong compression function in the sense that they treat x_i and H_{i-1} in the same way.

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Construction (6)

Observation: attacks on f do not necessarily mean attacks on h

- (2nd) preimage for f with chosen H_{i-1}
 \leadsto (2nd) preimage for h
- pseudo-preimage: (2nd) preimage for f with random H_{i-1}
 \leadsto preimage for h if IV can be changed
 \leadsto (2nd) preimage for h in time $2^{(n+s)/2}$ if pseudo-preimage in 2^s
- pseudo-collision: collision for compress with $H_{i-1} \neq H'_{i-1}$
 \leadsto certification weakness only
- collision for f with random H_{i-1}
 \leadsto collision for h if IV can be changed
- collision for f with chosen H_{i-1}
 \leadsto collision for h

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Defeating Merkle-Damgård for (2nd) preimages

[Dean-Felten-Hu'99] and [Kelsey-Schneier, Eurocrypt05]

Known since Merkle: if one hashes 2^t **messages**, the average effort to find a second preimage for one of them is 2^{n-t} .

New: if one hashes 2^t message **blocks** with an iterated hash function, the effort to find a second preimage is only


$$t2^{n/2+1} + 2^{n-t+1}$$

Idea: use fixed points to match the correct length
 Finding fixed points can be easy (e.g., Davies-Meyer).
 But still very long messages

Conclusion: appending the length does not work for 2nd preimage attacks.

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
Defeating Merkle-Damgård for (2nd) preimages



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Construction (5)

Advantage of strong compression function f : tree construction.




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How (not) to strengthen a hash function?

Answer concatenation:

Consider h_1 (n_1 -bit result) and h_2 (n_2 -bit result), with $n_1 \geq n_2$.



Intuition: the strength of $g(x)$ is the product of the strength of the two hash functions (if both are “independent”).

But ...

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Multicollisions [Joux, Crypto 2004]

Consider h_1 (n_1 -bit result) and h_2 (n_2 -bit result), with $n_1 \geq n_2$. The concatenation of two iterated hash functions ($g(x) = h_1(x) || h_2(x)$) is only as strong as the strongest of the two hash functions (even if both are independent).

- Cost of collision attack against g

$$\leq n_1 \cdot 2^{n_2/2} + 2^{n_1/2} \ll 2^{(n_1+n_2)/2}$$

- Cost of (2nd) preimage attack against g

$$\leq n_1 \cdot 2^{n_2/2} + 2^{n_1} + 2^{n_2} \ll 2^{n_1+n_2}$$

If either of the functions is weak, the attacks may work better

Main observation: finding multiple collisions for an iterated hash function is not much harder than finding a single collision.

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Multicollisions by Joux

for H_0 , collision for block 1: x_1, x'_1

for H_1 , collision for block 2: x_2, x'_2

for H_2 , collision for block 3: x_3, x'_3

for H_3 , collision for block 4: x_4, x'_4

now we have a 16-fold multicollision for h


$$h(x_1 || x_2 || x_3 || x_4)$$

$$= h(x'_1 || x_2 || x_3 || x_4)$$

$$= \dots$$

$$= h(x'_1 || x'_2 || x'_3 || x_4)$$

$$= h(x'_1 || x'_2 || x'_3 || x'_4)$$



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Construction (7): UOWH

[Naor-Yung 89]

Composition lemma for UOWH

[Bellare-Rogaway 97]

- XOR linear scheme
- basic tree hash
- exor tree hash

efficiency improvements

[Shoup 00], [Sarkar04], [Lee, Chang, Lee, Sung, Nandi 04]

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Custom Designed Hash Functions (1)

shortlist:

- MD4-family: MD4, extended MD4, MD5, SHA-1, RIPEMD-160, SHA-xxx
- MD2 (8 to 8-bit table)
- Snefru (8 to 32-bit tables, 8 passes)
- N-hash (FEAL-based)
- FFT-hash III (FFT transform)
- Subhash (hardware)
- Tiger (64-bit architecture)
- Panama (VLIW processor) – broken [2001]
- Whirlpool
- ... and many broken proposals ...

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
MD4-family (1)

MD4 & MD5 designed by Ron Rivest

- compression function: 512+128-bit input, 128-bit output
- bitwise AND, NOT, OR, XOR, $+$ mod 2^{32} , rotations
- compact and fast on 32-bit processors
- serial operations: software oriented
- each message words is used 3 times (4 times for MD5)
- one round consists of 16 steps and uses each message word once

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MD4-family (2): 4 steps




step operation:

$$MD4 : A := (A + F_r(B, C, D) + X[j] + K_r) \lll s_s$$

$$MD5 : A := B + (A + F_r(B, C, D) + X[j] + K_s) \lll s_s$$

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Step for MD4

- updates one word of chaining variable
- based on
 - Boolean function f_r
 - message word X_j
 - additive constant K_s
 - rotation amounts s_s
- operations on 32-bit words
 - addition mod 2^{32}
 - fixed rotations ($\gg 11, \gg 7$)
 - bitwise AND, XOR (f_r)


MDx-family: properties

Algorithm	n	rounds	steps	word	block	endianness
MD4	128	3	48	32	512	Little
ext-MD4	256	2×3	96	32	512	Little
MD5	128	4	64	32	512	Little
SHA-1 (SHA)	160	4	$80 + 64$	32	512	Big
RIPEND	128	2×3	96	32	512	Little
RIPEND-128	128	2×4	128	32	512	Little
RIPEND-160	160	2×5	160	32	512	Little
SHA-256	256	–	$64 + 64$	32	512	Big
SHA-384	384	–	$80 + 64$	64	1024	Big
SHA-512	512	–	$80 + 64$	64	1024	Big
HAVAL	128- -256	3,4,5	96,128, 160	32	1024	Little

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The MDx-family: pedigree



MDx-family: history of attacks

- collisions MD4₁₂ [Merkle '90]
- collisions MD4₂₃ [den Boer, Bosselaers '91]
- pseudo-collisions MD5 [den Boer, Bosselaers '93]
- collisions MD4₁₂, near collisions MD4 [Vaudenay '94]
- unidentified problem with SHA [NSA '94]
- [Dobbertin '95-'97]:
 - collisions RIPEMD₂₃, RIPEMD₁₂
 - collisions MD4 (even with structure)
 - collisions for ext-MD4 compress with random IV
 - collisions for MD5 compress with random IV
 - preimage for MD4₁₂
- collisions for SHA in 2^{61} [Chabaud, Joux '98]
- collisions for 2 rounds of RIPEMD [Debaert, Gilbert '01]

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MD4-family (6): history of attacks

- Collision attacks on reduced 2-round versions of HAVAL [Kasselman-Penzhorn '00] [Park-Sung-Chee-Lim '02] [Her-Sakurai-Kim'03]
- Saarinen 2003: slide attacks on SHA and MD5
- simplified SHA-xxx ($+ \rightarrow \oplus$, symmetric constants) has symmetry properties [Gilbert-Handschuh '03]
- Collisions for Haval [Biryukov, Van Rompay, Preneel '02]
- Collisions for SHA-0 in 2^{50} [Joux et al. '04]
- Collisions for MD4 (by hand), MD5, and RIPEMD [Wang, Feng, Lai, Yu '04]
- Attack on 53 out of 80 rounds of SHA-1 [Biham, Chen '04]
- Attack on 53 out of 80 rounds of SHA-1 [Rijmen, Oswald '04]
- 2^{39} attack on SHA-0 [Wang, Yu, Yin '05]
- 2^{66} attack on SHA-1 [Wang, Yin, Yu '05]

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MD4-family (7): SHA-1 & RIPEMD-160

common features:

- 160-bit result
- extra rotate on one of the message words ('MSB problem')
- both in ISO/IEC 10118-3:1998 (also RIPEMD-128)

RIPEMD-160: ([ftp.esat.kuleuven.ac.be /pub/COSIC/bosselaer](ftp.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/pub/COSIC/bosselaer))

- two independent parallel halves, which are made as different as possible (order of message words, Boolean functions, constants, rotations)
- 5 rounds

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MD4-family (8): SHA-1 & RIPEMD-160

SHA-1: (FIPS 180)

- no repetition of message words, but encoding ($j \geq 16$):

$$X[j] := (X[j-3] \oplus X[j-8] \oplus X[j-14] \oplus X[j-16]) \lll 1;$$

= systematic linear code [$n = 2560, k = 512, d < 86$]

compared to SHA:

- bitwise shortened cyclic code [$n = 80, k = 16, d = 23$]

$$X[j] := X[j-2] \oplus X[j-3] \oplus X[j-7] \oplus X[j-16];$$

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MD4-family (9): SHA-xxx

SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512

- message processing:

$$X[j] := \sigma_1(X[j-2]) \oplus X[j-7] \oplus \sigma_0(X[j-15]) \oplus X[j-16];$$

with σ_i = sum of 2 rotated and 1 shifted value of the same variable

- more complex round functions: each step has multiplexer, majority, Σ -function (sum of 3 rotated versions of input)
- 64 different constants
- SHA-384, SHA-512: 64-bit words
- SHA-384 is obtained by truncating result of SHA-512

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Whirlpool [Rijmen-Barreto00]

- based on a Rijndael-like block cipher with a 512-bit block and a 512-bit key (state: 8×8 matrix)

$$E_K(X) \oplus X \oplus K$$

- key schedule (message input): same rounds as block cipher with constant key
- S-box is *not* inverse, but built of four 4-bit S-boxes
- best known attack: 6 rounds out of 10

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Based on Block Ciphers (1)

Why:

- trust
- reduce design, evaluation, and implementation effort
- compact implementation

Why not:

- slow (key schedule)
- export restrictions
- weaknesses which are not relevant to encryption


rate = # blocks hashed per encryption

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Based on Block Ciphers (2)

single block length hash functions:

- 12 'secure' schemes of rate 1; one in ISO/IEC 10118-1
- collision $2^{n/2}$, (2nd) preimage 2^n



security proof: [Winternitz '82] [Black, Rogaway, Shrimpton '02]

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Based on Block Ciphers (3)

double block length hash functions with rate 1:

$$H_i^1 = E_{A_i^1}(B_i^1) \oplus C_i^1$$

$$H_i^2 = E_{A_i^2}(B_i^2) \oplus C_i^2$$

- A_i^1, B_i^1, C_i^1 binary linear combinations of $H_{i-1}^1, H_{i-1}^2, x_i^1$, and x_i^2
- A_i^2, B_i^2, C_i^2 are binary linear combinations of $H_{i-1}^1, H_{i-1}^2, x_i^1, x_i^2$, and H_i^1 .

goal: collision 2^m , (2nd) preimage 2^{2m}

BUT:

- [Hohl et al. 94]: compression function has at most security level of single length hash function
- [Knudsen-Preneel-Lai 96]: collisions in time $2^{3m/4}$ or $2^{m/2}$

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Based on Block Ciphers (4)

rate < 1:


- [Brachtl et al. (IBM) 89] MDC-2: rate 1/2
ISO/IEC 10118-2
- [Brachtl et al. (IBM) 89] MDC-4: rate 1/4

security for DES:

	rate	collision	preimage	coll (f)	preimage (f)
MDC-2	1/2	2^{55}	2^{83}	2^{28}	2^{54}
MDC-4	1/4	2^{56}	2^{109}	2^{41}	2^{90}

problem: proof of security?

Based on Block Ciphers (6): MDC-4




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Based on Block Ciphers (5): MDC-2

$$E_K^{\oplus}(X) = E_K(X) \oplus X$$



Based on Block Ciphers (7)

double block length hash functions:
(with collision resistant compression function)


- [Merkle 89]
 - security proof (2^{56}) based on black box model of DES
 - rate between 1/18... 1/4, inconvenient block sizes
- [Knudsen-Preneel 96-97]:
 - security proof (2^{72}) based on black box model of DES
 - rate 1/3 with 9 parallel encryptions
- [Aiello-Haber-Venkatesan 98]:
 - modify key schedule
 - security proof for several assumptions on DES
 - very high speed
- research topic ...

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Based on Block Ciphers (8): Merkle

$$E_K^\oplus(X) = E_K(X) \oplus X$$



$$\begin{aligned} |H_{1_i}| &= 55 \\ |H_{2_i}| &= 57 \\ |x_i| &= 7 \end{aligned}$$

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Based on Block Ciphers (9): Knudsen-Preneel

Assumption 1. Davies-Meyer: $H_i = E_{x_i}(H_{i-1}) \oplus H_{i-1}$
compression function: collision $2^{m/2}$, preimage 2^m

Definition Multiple Davies-Meyer

$$H_i^j = h^j(X^j, Y^j) = E_{X^j}(Y^j) \oplus Y^j,$$

where $(X^j, Y^j) = F(H_{i-1}^1, \dots, H_{i-1}^n, x_i^1, \dots, x_i^r)$, for $j = 1, \dots, n$

Assumption 2 (Multiple D-M) (!wrong for $n > 5$ - Dai Watanabe 05)

- assume collision “involves” $\geq N$ h^j 's
- let $N - v$ be max. no. of h^j 's that can be attacked independently of each other
- assumption: for all h^j s
 - collisions for compression function take $\geq 2^{(v/2)m}$
 - preimages for compression function take $\geq 2^{vm}$

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Based on Block Ciphers (10): Knudsen-Preneel

Theorem. If \exists quaternary code $[n, k, d]$ with $2k > n$, then \exists parallel hash function s.t. for the compression function, finding a collision takes $2^{(d-1)m/2}$ operations and finding a (2nd) preimage takes $2^{(d-1)m}$ operations.

extension: codes over $GF(2^4)$

$GF(2^2)$		$GF(2^4)$		Collision
Code	Rate	Code	Rate	
[5, 3, 3]	1/5	[6, 4, 3]	1/3	$\geq 2^m$
[8, 5, 3]	1/4	[8, 6, 3]	1/2	$\geq 2^m$
[12, 9, 3]	1/2	[12, 10, 3]	2/3	$\geq 2^m$
[9, 5, 4]	1/9	[9, 6, 4]	1/3	$\geq 2^{3m/2}$
[16, 12, 4]	1/2	[16, 13, 4]	5/8	$\geq 2^{3m/2}$

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Based on Block Ciphers (11): Knudsen-Preneel

For m -bit block cipher with m -bit keys, using [8, 5, 3] shortened Hamming Code over $GF(2^2)$

$$H_i^1 = h^1(H_{i-1}^1, x_i^1)$$

$$H_i^2 = h^2(H_{i-1}^3, H_{i-1}^4)$$

$$H_i^3 = h^3(H_{i-1}^5, H_{i-1}^6)$$

$$H_i^4 = h^4(H_{i-1}^7, H_{i-1}^8)$$

$$H_i^5 = h^5(H_{i-1}^2, x_i^2)$$

$$H_i^6 = h^6(H_{i-1}^3 \oplus H_{i-1}^5 \oplus H_{i-1}^7 \oplus H_{i-1}^2, H_{i-1}^4 \oplus H_{i-1}^6 \oplus H_{i-1}^8 \oplus x_i^2)$$

$$H_i^7 = h^7(H_{i-1}^1 \oplus H_{i-1}^2, x_i^1 \oplus x_i^2)$$

$$H_i^8 = h^8(H_{i-1}^1 \oplus H_{i-1}^3 \oplus H_{i-1}^4 \oplus H_{i-1}^6 \oplus H_{i-1}^7, x_i^1 \oplus H_{i-1}^3 \oplus H_{i-1}^5 \oplus H_{i-1}^6 \oplus H_{i-1}^8)$$

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Based on Algebraic Structures (1)

Why:

- sometimes one can prove security reductions
- compact implementation
- fast (knapsack-type problems)

Why not:

- mathematical structure can be exploited
- slow (modular exponentiation)
- vulnerable to trapdoors

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Algebraic Structures (2): modular arithmetic

how to generate the RSA modulus?

answer: secure multi-party computation

[Boneh-Franklin 97], [Frankel-MacKenzie-Yung 98]

schemes with security reduction:

- [Damgård 87]: equivalent to factoring
- [Gibson 91]: discrete logarithm modulo a composite
- [Chaum et al. 91], [Brands], [Bellare et al. 94]
discrete logarithm in a group of prime order G_p
 - prime p and t random elements α_i from G_p ($\alpha_i \neq 1$).

$$H_{t+1} = \prod_{i=1}^t \alpha_i^{\tilde{x}_i} \quad \text{with } \tilde{x}_i = 1 \parallel x_i$$

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Algebraic Structures (3): modular arithmetic

schemes without security reduction:

- many broken proposals, including CCITT X.509 Annex D
- most promising: ISO/IEC 10118-4:1998

MASH-1 (Modular Arithmetic Secure Hash)

$$H_i = ((x_i \oplus H_{i-1}) \vee A)^2 \pmod{N} \oplus H_{i-1}$$

$A = 0xF00\dots00$

x_i : 4 most significant bits in every byte equal to 1111

output transformation that reduces output size to at most $n/2$

MASH-2: replace exponent 2 by $2^8 + 1$

security for n -bit RSA modulus:

- best known attacks: preimage in $2^{n/2}$, collision in $2^{n/4}$
- feedforward of H_{i-1} essential

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Algebraic Structures (4): knapsacks and lattices

additive knapsacks:

knapsack problem of dimensions n and $\ell(n)$:

given a set of n l -bit integers $\{a_1, a_2, \dots, a_n\}$, and an l -bit integer S find a vector X with components x_i equal to 0 or 1 such that

$$\sum_{i=1}^n a_i \cdot x_i = S \pmod{2^{\ell(n)}}.$$

for hashing, one needs $n > \ell(n)$.

the **good** news:

- [Impagliazzo-Naor 96]: UOWH as secure as knapsack
- [Ajtai 96], [Goldreich+ 96]: one-way and collision-resistant function if approximating the shortest vector in a lattice to polynomial factors is hard
- [Sendrier et al.]: random matrix + structured input: syndrome decoding is hard problem

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Algebraic Structures (5): knapsacks and lattices

the **bad** news:

- the knapsack problem seems to be 'too easy' for realistic parameters (1000 vectors of 500 bits).
- LLL for $\ell(n) > 1.0629n$
- [Camion-Patarin 91] and [Patarin 93] for $n \gg \ell(n)$
- [Wagner-02] generalized birthday attack

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Algebraic Structures (6): knapsacks and lattices

multiplicative knapsacks: [Tillich-Zémor 94]

matrix product in group $SL_2(F_{2^n})$

$$A = \begin{pmatrix} X & 1 \\ 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix} \quad B = \begin{pmatrix} X & X+1 \\ 1 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

$$\pi\{0, 1\} \rightarrow \{A, B\}; 0 \mapsto A, 1 \mapsto B$$

$$h(x_1 x_2 \dots x_n) = \pi(x_1) \cdot \pi(x_2) \dots \pi(x_n)$$

evaluation:

- + proof that two colliding messages have 'large' Hamming distance
- + parallelism
- new attacks using algebraic structure

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Incremental hashing

incrementality [Bellare et al. 94]

Given x and $h(x)$, if a small modification is made to x , resulting in x' , one can update $h(x)$ in time proportional to the amount of modification between x and x' , rather than having to recompute $h(x')$ from scratch.

[Bellare-Micciancio 97]

- hash individual blocks of message
- combine hash values with a group operation, e.g., multiplication in a group of prime order in which the discrete logarithm problem is hard

proof based on 'random oracle' assumption

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Concluding Remarks

- we understand very little about the security of hash functions
- designers have been too optimistic (over and over again...)
- do we need a 'small' collision resistant compression function?
- how do we design a collision resistant compression function?
- more work should be done on other security properties: (2nd) preimage resistance, partial preimage resistance, pseudo-randomness, security with iterated applications,...

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