Date: Wed, 26 Apr 95 15:18:43 EST Errors-To: Comp-privacy Error Handler From: Computer Privacy Digest Moderator To: Comp-privacy@uwm.edu Subject: Computer Privacy Digest V6#040 Computer Privacy Digest Wed, 26 Apr 95 Volume 6 : Issue: 040 Today's Topics: Moderator: Leonard P. Levine Re: Could What You Post be Used to Profile You? Censorship and Freedom of Speech Re: Privacy "Remailer" for Phones California Digital Signature Bill Who (Secretly) Reads Your Email? The Tools of Freedom and Privacy - and their Demolition Yeltsin Edict on Cryptography Info on CPD [unchanged since 12/29/94] ---------------------------------------------------------------------- From: sls477@ku-eichstaett.de (MARTIN VIRTEL) Date: 25 Apr 1995 13:00:24 GMT Subject: Re: Could What You Post be Used to Profile You? Organization: KU Eichstaett (FRG) phanssen@uniwa.uwa.edu.au (Paul Hanssen) writes: .. and write a program to sort all incoming articles by person? This information could then be used to make up a profile of likes/dislikes and opinions of that person, whether true or not. Some people I know in Germany tried it, filtering out adresses of people's contributions to newsgroups (yes, some germans put their adress into the .signature), and then grouping them by the subjects of the conferences they posted to. They then contacted adress brokers and offered the data gathered (NOT explaining the way they gathered it...). These adresses are worth around 2-5 dollars apiece, they were told. so much for that -- Martin ------------------------------ From: Leonard A DiMenna Date: 26 Apr 1995 09:15:21 -0400 (EDT) Subject: Censorship and Freedom of Speech How do you decide which is censorship and which is freedom of speech? It is very reasonable that certain people shouldn't have access to areas that have adult matieral. Who descides what is moral and what isn't? There is no black and white only shades of gray. ------------------------------ From: fd@wwa.com (Glen L. Roberts) Date: 26 Apr 1995 19:48:16 GMT Subject: Re: Privacy "Remailer" for Phones Organization: WorldWide Access - Chicago Area Internet Services PruRE (prure@aol.com) wrote: I want to get around "caller ID". Is anyone aware of a service that accomplishes for a phone call the same thing that remailer does for email? Thanks! 1-900-STOPPER does it for $1.95/min -- Glen L. Roberts, Editor, Full Disclosure Host Full Disclosure Live (WWCR 5,065 khz - Sundays 7pm central) email POSTAL address to glr@ripco.com for catalog on privacy & surveillance. ------------------------------ From: Privacy Rights Clearinghouse Date: 24 Apr 1995 13:49:29 -0700 (PDT) Subject: California Digital Signature Bill Those interested in on-line privacy should be aware of a bill in the California Legislature. A.B. 1577, sponsored by Debra Bowen, addresses the issue of digital signatures. There are versions of the same bill under consideration in Oregon, Washington, and Utah as well. Evidently, the bill would provide for a certification procedure that would be used to verify the digital signature of anyone who has had their signature "certified." The bill would provide for a publicly-accessible database of certificates, which could be accessed by anyone wishing to verify a digital signature. We have looked over the bill and, while we believe something along these lines is essential to prevent widespread fraud and misrepresentation in on-line activities, we are concerned that this specific bill raises several serious privacy concerns. The public database idea may be particularly intrusive. This sounds like a direct marketer's dream: a fully accessible database of e-mail addresses that are certified authentic and reliable for on-line sales up to an expressed amount. Will it be possible to access the repository and compile a list of e-mail addresses which could then be used for marketing purposes? For example, could a list of all certificates with "recommended reliance limits" above $1000 be culled from these repositories? If other information is included in the certificate, would direct marketers be able to search for all e-mail addresses, say, in a certain zip code or area code? There may be other privacy problems with A.B. 1577. We would like to hear comments from anyone regarding this bill. If you wish, we can forward your comments to Assemblywoman Bowen's office. The legislative counsel's digest of the bill is attached. The full text of the bill (about 30 pages worth) are available on the Net from: gopher sen.ca.gov [Under the Bills, Codes, & Analyses..] http://www.sen.ca.gov [Under the sen.ca.gov gopher interface] gopher mother.com [Under California/Assemblywoman Debra Bowen/Bills: 1995-96 Session] If you have comments, please contact the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse: voice 800.773.7748 (outside California 619.298.3396) e-mail prc@acusd.edu LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST AB 1577, as introduced, Bowen. Digital signatures. Existing statutes do not generally govern the authenticity and verification of electronic or similar data intended to act as a signature, except in the case of electronic fund transfers in nonconsumer situations which provides for security procedures related to verification of authenticity of orders. This bill would add the California Digital Signature Act. A digital signature would be a sequence of bits meeting certain encryption requirements, that would be as valid as if it had been written on paper, except in the case of a digital signature that would make a negotiable instrument payable to bearer, which would be void except to effectuate a funds transfer or a transaction between financial institutions. The bill would further set forth the effect of certain actions taken with respect to digital signatures. The bill would provide for the issuance of a certificate by a certification authority that would contain information to verify a digital signature of a subscriber. The bill would provide for a database of certificates by repositories. The bill would provide for the licensure of certification authorities by the Office of Information Technology, and for the recognition of repositories. The bill would require the office to be a repository. The bill would provide for fees, and would impose related duties on the office. The bill would set forth provisions governing and limiting the liability of certification authorities and repositories. The bill would make it a misdemeanor for a person to knowingly or intentionally misrepresent to a certification authority his or her identity, name, distinguished name, or authorization when requesting suspension of a certificate, thereby imposing a state-mandated local program. ==================================================================== Barry D. Fraser fraser@acusd.edu Online Legal Research Associate Privacy Rights Clearinghouse prc@acusd.edu Center for Public Interest Law Gopher gopher.acusd.edu University of San Diego Select "USD Campus-Wide Info" Privacy Hotline: 619-298-3396 BBS: 619-260-4789 In California: 800-773-7748 host: teetot login: privacy ==================================================================== ------------------------------ From: Deborah Barett Date: 21 Apr 1995 00:18:29 -0700 Subject: Who (Secretly) Reads Your Email? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- *** Frequently Asked Questions About E-Mail Privacy *** by Andre Bacard, Author of (The) COMPUTER PRIVACY HANDBOOK "The Scariest Computer Book of the Year" [FAQ Version April 12, 1995] ============================================================ This article offers a nontechnical overview of possible threats to YOUR e-mail privacy, and it suggest two key steps that you can take to guard your privacy. I have written this especially for persons with a sense of humor. You may distribute this (unaltered) FAQ for non- commercial purposes. =========================================================== Can people (secretly) read your e-mail? Very likely yes. Most electronic mail is notoriously UNPRIVATE. E-mail is less secure, and in many ways more dangerous, than sending your personal or business messages on a postcard. Who secretly reads your e-mail? A MACWORLD survey found that roughly 25% of the businesses contacted admitted that they eavesdrop on employee computer files, e-mail, or voice mail. This 25% excludes unauthorized e-mail monitoring. When I asked a Silicon Valley C.E.O. if he uses e-mail, he said: "Hell no, Andre. Half the nerds in my company can hack e-mail. E-mail is a party line!" Internet e-mail, the kind that brought you this FAQ, is child's play for some people to intercept. Your typical e-mail message travels through many computers. At each computer, people can access your personal and business correspondence. It's a safe bet that administrators (not to mention hackers) on Bulletin Board Systems, college campus systems, commercial information services, and Internet hook-up providers can read your e-mail. Of course most snoops will deny they're reading your e-mail because they want to continue doing so. Doesn't my password protect me? Charles Piller, in his excellent article entitled "Bosses With X-Ray Eyes," reports on a study MACWORLD made of Macintosh software. Here is part of Piller's conclusion: "All the major electronic-mail and groupware products that combine messaging, file management, and scheduling (such as WordPerfect Office) allow the network administrator to change passwords at any time, then read, delete, or alter any messages on the server. With few exceptions, network-monitor programs such as AG Group's LocalPeek, Farallon Computing's Traffic Watch II, and Neon Software's NetMinder, allow astute managers to read files transmitted over the net. In short, these tools are only slightly less invasive than others specifically designed for surveillance and used primarily on mainframe systems." Unix, Dos and other software networks are just as easy for administrators to manipulate. Who is to stop your Internet hook-up provider or any network supervisor from using or distributing your password? Doesn't my e-mail vanish after I read and "delete" it? In many cases, NO! Many Internet providers and network administrators "archive" (store) your incoming and outgoing mail on a computer disk for six months or more AFTER you think that you've deleted your mail. If someone sues you (for example, in a divorce), he or she may be able to subpoena and READ your previous correspondence. Of course, unauthorized snoops might chose to read your archive for their own reasons. What motivates a snoop? Maybe he's a thief who sells company business plans or customer lists. Perhaps she's the office intriguer trying to play people against you. Possibly he's a computer stalker like the fellow who shot actress Rebecca Schaffer to death. Conceivably she's a blackmailer. Maybe he's an old-fashioned voyeur. Information is power. Snoops want power. Whatsamatter, I've got nothing to hide. Why do I need e-mail privacy? Show me an e-mail user who has no financial, sexual, social, political, or professional secrets to keep from his family, his neighbors, or his colleagues, and I'll show you someone who is either an extraordinary exhibitionist or an incredible dullard. Show me a corporation that has no trade secrets or confidential records, and I'll show you a business that is not very successful. Robert Ellis Smith, Publisher of the PRIVACY JOURNAL, quips, "An employee with nothing to hide may well be an employee with nothing to offer." Privacy, discretion, confidentiality, and prudence are hallmarks of civilization. OK, maybe I could use e-mail privacy. What can I do? There are two big, practical steps that you can take. First, use PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) software to encrypt your e-mail (and computer files) so that snoops cannot read them. PGP is the de facto world standard software for e-mail security. Second, use anonymous remailers to send e-mail to network news groups or to persons so that the recipient (and snoops) cannot tell your real name or e-mail address. Where can I learn more about these privacy tools? Two excellent places to start are the Usenet news groups alt.security.pgp and alt.privacy.anon-server. Also, I've written FAQs about Anonymous Remailers and PGP (Pretty Good Privacy). See below. Anything else I should know? Yes. YOUR privacy and safety are in danger! Prolific bank, credit and medical databases, computer matching programs, cordless & cellular phone scanners, the Clipper Chip Initiative, the Digital Telephony law, and (hidden) video surveillance are just a few factors that threaten every law abiding citizen. The COMPUTER PRIVACY HANDBOOK gives many chilling examples. In short, our anti-privacy society serves criminals and snoops computer data about YOU on a silver platter. If you want to protect YOUR privacy, I urge YOU to support groups such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation and the Electronic Privacy Information Center . Andre, have you written other privacy-related FAQs? I'm circulating an (1) Anonymous Remailer FAQ, (2) E-Mail Privacy FAQ, and (3) PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) Software FAQ. To get these FAQs, send me this: To: abacard@well.sf.ca.us Subject: Send FAQs Info Message: [Ignored] **************************************************************** Bacard wrote "The Computer Privacy "Privacy permits you Handbook: A Practical Guide to E-Mail to be yourself." Encryption, Data Protection, and PGP Privacy Software" [for novices/experts]. Introduction written by Mitchell Kapor, Creator of Lotus 1-2-3 and Co-founder of the Electronic Frontier Foundation. Book Available from Bookstores or: Peachpit Press, 2414 Sixth Street, Berkeley, CA 94710 Call (800) 283-9444 or (510) 548-4393 ISBN # 1-56609-171-3 ***************************************************************** -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.7 iQCVAwUBL4tEvN6pT6nCx/9/AQHnHAQAsuh3OWSofVvJYp8aZSLi2/T/DXCI4pL9 q6+WFQvd96MK6DhH6M8bD6yPgXe7K6qWktjht+6SnHNIwAwTc1ikd3UFbunfkP2u 0QCRg+eestjfGTeiw65Fcc6IiPq0zRYT+G+d+NnwOGlxDISO4+2Z2fXPS57MDCqk 1cfmDFLEq+Q= =lk6W -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ------------------------------ From: jwarren@well.sf.ca.us (Jim Warren) Date: 26 Apr 1995 09:54:02 +0800 Subject: The Tools of Freedom and Privacy - and their Demolition Hi all - Although this at first glance appears to only concern the world's most widespread (free) cryptography program, PGP, in fact, most of it concerns our nation and whether our government will permit our citizens to retain any of the substantive freedoms on which it was founded. Author John Perry Barlow is one of the co-founders of the Electronic Frontier Foundation (and a former chair of the Republican Central Committee of his WY county's Repub Party ... but also a lyricist for the Grateful Dead :-). The person who forwarded it to his *large* international "interesting-people" mailing list, Dave Farber, is an internationally renown computer and networking scientist who has served and is serving on several of the federal government's and Congress' most major computer security commissions. I find this compelling reading. I wonder if one or two mad bombers in Oklahoma should be justification for turning this nation into a surveillance society that will make Singapore and the old KGB envious? Clinton and the FBI leadership are using it to justify massive expansion of surveillance systems - endangering 280-million people because of the actions of less than a dozen in Oklahoma and New York. It seems like those several allegedly rejected militia members have placed the top on the coffin of freedom and privacy, and government leaders are now preparing to nail it shut, exactly as the bombers apparently most-feared - a far greater reason even, for the public horror and mourning of our nation, than the insane death and destruction they created. How much will we, the People, give up - how much more will the government take - of our freedom and privacy, in the pursuit of the unattainable delusion of "peace in our time"? -- jim Posted-Date: Wed, 26 Apr 1995 05:03:52 -0400 Date: 26 Apr 1995 05:03:54 -0400 From: farber@central.cis.upenn.edu (David Farber) Subject: A Pretty Bad Problem -- Forward to PGP User's Guide by Phil Zimmerman [with permission from John B.] To: interesting-people@eff.org (interesting-people mailing list) A Pretty Bad Problem Forward to PGP User's Guide by Phil Zimmerman by John Perry Barlow I love irony, and there lies in this book an irony as striking as any I know. It is this: that a computer program with the cute li'l ol' name of Pretty Good Privacy, written by an apparently unformidable gnome on a tight budget, now terrifies a security monolith that required half a century, uncounted billions of dollars, and the collective IQ's of a few thousand geniuses to develop. This book and the software it describes, as brief and modest as its author, could very well be the root tendril that will grow into the National Security State and shatter it. It that is true, it's probably only a little hyperbolic to claim that you are holding a work as liberating as Common Sense, or, viewed through another set of bunker slits, as socially disruptive as Mein Kampf. That doubtless sounds like a pretty disruptive statement itself, but it's not unconsidered. It seems to me that the combination of distributed digital technology and robust encryption has brought informatized society to a very sharp balance point between two lousy choices. On one side lies a technological foundation upon which the most massive totalitarianism could be built. On the other is a jungle in which any number of anarchic guerrillas might hide, upon whom little order could ever be imposed. Assuming I'm not simply raving here, what leads me to this conclusion? Have things really gotten this weird? I honestly believe they may have. At present most of us unwittingly leave a highly visible and nearly indelible trail in Cyberspace. Every time we make a modern financial transaction, use the telephone, send an e-mail message, we leave a path of bits from which anyone who's interested and properly equipped can assemble the detailed informational ghosts of our naked selves. If you have something you'd rather hide, don't hide it there. Furthermore, the tools of surveillance are becoming far more sophisticated and conducive to centralization. Massive pattern recognition engines can be applied to the Net from, say, Washington, DC or Beijing, and specifically tuned to recognize certain kinds of activities. Or even beliefs. Any government that can automatically generate an intimate profile of every one of its citizens is a government endowed with a potential for absolute power that will eventually, to use Lord Acton's phrase, corrupt absolutely. Few civil liberties are likely to survive such capacities in the hands of the increasingly panicky authoritarians who run the embattled old bureaucracies of the Meat World. Worse, their panic may be justified. An equally apprehensive and growing lot of cyber-libertarians now have at their disposal tools as unbalancingly powerful in their power to conceal as are the other side's in the service of revelation. One of these sabots goes by the mild name of Pretty Good Privacy. Any number of citizens armed with PGP and such of its relations as digital cash and anonymous Net remailers can simply vanish from the governmental radar. They are at greater liberty than ever before to conduct any endeavor, including something that, as Phil frankly puts it at the beginning of this book, "shouldn't be illegal, but is." They can exempt themselves from taxes and yet maintain precise accounting records. In many ways, they can effectively resign from the community of the governed and enter a condition in which their actions ordered by conscience and culture alone. And we may get a chance to find out just how well these are going to work as the primary templates for social order. There is no question that the patterns of unwritten code that arise from culture can work when the society in question is small, simple, or highly homogeneous. For example, I come from a part of Wyoming where something like the Code of the West is still more important than the law or its instruments. It works pretty well. I don't have a key to my house, and through many years in the cattle business, I signed few contracts and was never knowingly cheated. Something similar obtains in Japan, a much larger and more complex society which is nevertheless monocultural enough to resist chaos far more by general consent than by any order that police might enforce. And it is nearly crime free. The emergent social orders of both Japan and Wyoming strongly support the idea that a less legalistic approach to the vicissitudes of life among the humans will work. What it less well known is whether it is possible to return to such a condition and whether truly diverse societies, such as we have in America, can ordered primarily by cultural norms. Present evidence from both the former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia is not so promising. After 70 years of the most heroic efforts to force order by imposed regulation, the great iron lid is off. And it is no Rousseauvian paradise to which the Russians have returned. They appear to be governed less by ethics than by criminals who would probably govern better if they were organized. Meanwhile the Balkans have returned to a state of tribal bloodshed that indicates that a strong sense of community, as expressed in cultural immune response, can be more disruptive than ordering. But what are the choices? Do we allow matters to continue along their present technological trajectory, eventually endowing our government (and practically any marketing organization) with a magnifying window into the least of our lives? Do we allow ourselves to become intimately vulnerable to faceless bureaucracies to whom we will be incredibly well known yet remain faceless ourselves? We have gone too far that way already. But what can prevent a further tumble toward that dark horizon? Do we try to hide our trails behind laws (favored by Europeans) that would define what might be the appropriate contents for a database? Do we endow government with the ability to define forbidden knowledge? I don't have much enthusiasm for this solution, which sounds to me rather like having a Peeping Tom install one's window blinds, I do not trust government with the ability to regulate information, especially information that contains within it such a long lever of control as those things about yourself you'd rather no one knew. There are always special circumstances - grave matters of national security, they will insist. - in which it will seem obvious to our guardians that the sanctity of such laws is secondary to the greater public interest. Indeed, this is how we have been doing things in America for a long time. The Bill of Rights continues to apply only when the government feels no pain from its application. It's a tough choice, but I think I would prefer to give people the means to control their own information. I think it is best that this virus of liberty is loose on the Net. I would prefer to let my fellow citizens detach their economic transactions from their identities, despite the looming possibility that an anonymous economy will consider taxes voluntary. I would even rather extend to people the general condition of anonymity, hoping they will not use it much, knowing that without identity, there is little impetus for responsibility, and that without responsibility, the Social Contract is abrogated. While I have focused so far on the ability of PGP to conceal, it is the area of identity that this software may make its most positive contribution. Even as digital technology can make us to visible, the absence of real bodies places a garment of ambiguity on everyone who interacts on the Net. If community requires identity, what is to be done about the ease by which the virtual can take on one another's identities? To this dilemma, PGP provides an unambiguous solution: digital signature. Using the signing techniques enabled here, you can send and receive files with great assurance that they were generated by their purported authors and that their contents have not been altered. Once you are in the habit of authenticating your own words, no one may pretend to speak or act as you. You can be assured that you will only have to be responsible for your own actions and not the misdeeds of some phantom wearing your name. For the rest of what PGP enables, ambivalence is the only appropriate response. Still, I would at least rather everyone know how to use the tools whose operation this book describes, though I fervently hope they will be somewhat circumspect about actually using them. Just as an armed populace may be more resistant to certain excesses of governmental zeal, so might a populace armed with the ultimate defensive weapon, the ability to disappear, countervail against the all-seeing electronic eye. We had best be armed with something. It seems certain to me that any government that can see everything we do all the time will sooner or later feel compelled to add omnipotence to omniscience, which are, in the Virtual Age, much the same thing anyway. Maybe we will feel compelled to start using them. Maybe there will be anarchy, maybe even chaos. But chaos at least has an open architecture. Chaos has always been the native home of the infinitely possible. And among the possibilities I imagine is that human beings will turn out to be better, less paranoid, less worthy of inspiring paranoia, than many of us think. In the end, it doesn't matter much what they think or I think. The genie of guerrilla cryptography is out of the bottle. No one, not even its maker, can stuff it back in or keep it within what America laughably calls its borders. The genie is all over the Net. It's in your hands as you hold this book. Summon it with a conscience. But be prepared to summon it if you must. ------------------------------ From: "Prof. L. P. Levine" , Wed, 19 Apr 1995. Note: this is a preliminary translation, and Tseytin states he may not be fully competent to translate legal terms. This translation will probably be revised by subsequent translators] EDICT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ABOUT ARRANGEMENTS FOR ENFORCING LEGAL ORDER IN THE AREA OF DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION, SALES AND USE OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC INSTRUMENTS, AS WELL AS RENDERING SERVICES IN INFORMATION ENCRYPTION In order to secure unconditional fulfillment of the Law of the Russian Federation "About federal bodies for government communications and information", as well as to intensify the struggle against organized crime and to enhance protection of information and telecommunication systems of the bodies of state power, Russian structures for banking and finance, enterprises and organizations I decree: 1. The Programme for creation and development of information and telecommunication system for special assignments for the benefit of bodies of state power shall have the status of Presidential programme. The Center for Presidential programmes at the Administration of the President of the Russian federation jointly with the Federal agency for government communications and information attached to the President of the Russian Federation shall arrange for finishing and implementation of the programme. 2. To forbid use by government organizations and enterprises in their information and telecommunication systems of encryption instruments, including cryptographic instruments in support of authenticity of information (electronic signature), and protected technical devices for storing, processing and transmission of information which have no certificate from the Federal agency for government communications and information attached to the President of the Russian Federation, as well as giving government contracts to enterprises, organizations using said technical and encrypting instruments having no certificate from the Federal agency for government communications and information attached to the President of the Russian Federation. 3. To advise the Central bank of the Russian federation and the Federal agency for government communications and information attached to the President of the Russian Federation to take necessary actions with respect to commercial banks evading mandatory use of protected technical instruments for storing, processing and transmission of information, having a certificate from the Federal agency for government communications and information attached to the President of the Russian Federation, in their informational interaction with subdivisions of the Central bank of the Russian Federation. 4. For improvement of informational security of the Russian Federation and intensification of the struggle against organized crime, to forbid activities of legal and physical persons related to development, production, sales and use of encryption instruments as well as protected technical devices for storing, processing and transmission of information, rendering services in information encryption, without licenses issued by the Federal agency for government communications and information attached to the President of the Russian Federation, in accordance with the Law of the Russian Federation "About federal bodies for government communications and information". 5. The State customs committee of the Russian Federation shall take actions to stop import into the territory of the Russian Federation of cryptographic instruments of foreign make without a license from the Ministry for external economic relations of the Russian Federation issued with the consent of the Federal agency for government communications and information attached to the President of the Russian Federation. 6. The federal counterintelligence service of the Russian Federation jointly with the Federal agency for government communications and information attached to the President of the Russian Federation, the State tax service of the Russian Federation and the Department of tax police of the Russian Federation shall carry out detection of legal and physical persons violating the requirements of this edict. 7. To advise the Office of the Procurator-General of the Russian Federation to intensify procurator supervision of enforcement of the Law of the Russian Federation "About federal bodies for government communications and information" regarding development, production, sales and use of cryptographic instruments as well as rendering services in information encryption in Russian Federation, subject to licensing and certification by the Federal agency for government communications and information attached to the President of the Russian Federation. 8. To establish the Federal center for protection of economic information at the Federal agency for government communications and information attached to the President of the Russian Federation (within the personnel quota for this agency) with the mission of development and implementation of manifold programs of safeguarding security of economic information of Russian structures for banking, finance and other economically significant structures. The director-general of the Federal agency for government communications and information attached to the President of the Russian Federation shall approve within 2 months the Statute of the said center. 9. This edict takes effect since the day of its publication. President of the Russian Federation B.Yeltsin Moscow, Kremlin 3 April, 1995 no. 334 -- Stanton McCandlish
mech@eff.org

Electronic Frontier Foundation

Online Services Mgr. ------------------------------ From: "Prof. L. P. Levine" Date: 29 Dec 1994 10:50:22 -0600 (CST) Subject: Info on CPD [unchanged since 12/29/94] Organization: University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee The Computer Privacy Digest is a forum for discussion on the effect of technology on privacy or vice versa. The digest is moderated and gatewayed into the USENET newsgroup comp.society.privacy (Moderated). Submissions should be sent to comp-privacy@uwm.edu and administrative requests to comp-privacy-request@uwm.edu. This digest is a forum with information contributed via Internet eMail. Those who understand the technology also understand the ease of forgery in this very free medium. Statements, therefore, should be taken with a grain of salt and it should be clear that the actual contributor might not be the person whose email address is posted at the top. Any user who openly wishes to post anonymously should inform the moderator at the beginning of the posting. He will comply. If you read this from the comp.society.privacy newsgroup and wish to contribute a message, you should simply post your contribution. As a moderated newsgroup, attempts to post to the group are normally turned into eMail to the submission address below. On the other hand, if you read the digest eMailed to you, you generally need only use the Reply feature of your mailer to contribute. If you do so, it is best to modify the "Subject:" line of your mailing. Contributions to CPD should be submitted, with appropriate, substantive SUBJECT: line, otherwise they may be ignored. They must be relevant, sound, in good taste, objective, cogent, coherent, concise, and nonrepetitious. Diversity is welcome, but not personal attacks. Do not include entire previous messages in responses to them. Include your name & legitimate Internet FROM: address, especially from .UUCP and .BITNET folks. Anonymized mail is not accepted. All contributions considered as personal comments; usual disclaimers apply. All reuses of CPD material should respect stated copyright notices, and should cite the sources explicitly; as a courtesy; publications using CPD material should obtain permission from the contributors. Contributions generally are acknowledged within 24 hours of submission. If selected, they are printed within two or three days. The moderator reserves the right to delete extraneous quoted material. He may change the SUBJECT: line of an article in order to make it easier for the reader to follow a discussion. He will not, however, alter or edit or append to the text except for purely technical reasons. A library of back issues is available on ftp.cs.uwm.edu [129.89.9.18]. Login as "ftp" with password identifying yourid@yoursite. The archives are in the directory "pub/comp-privacy". People with gopher capability can most easily access the library at gopher.cs.uwm.edu. Mosaic users will find it at gopher://gopher.cs.uwm.edu. Older archives are also held at ftp.pica.army.mil [129.139.160.133]. ---------------------------------+----------------------------------------- Leonard P. Levine | Moderator of: Computer Privacy Digest Professor of Computer Science | and comp.society.privacy University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee | Post: comp-privacy@uwm.edu Box 784, Milwaukee WI 53201 | Information: comp-privacy-request@uwm.edu | Gopher: gopher.cs.uwm.edu levine@cs.uwm.edu | Mosaic: gopher://gopher.cs.uwm.edu ---------------------------------+----------------------------------------- ------------------------------ End of Computer Privacy Digest V6 #040 ****************************** .