Date: Tue, 30 Jan 96 18:39:18 EST Errors-To: Comp-privacy Error Handler From: Computer Privacy Digest Moderator To: Comp-privacy@uwm.edu Subject: Computer Privacy Digest V8#010 Computer Privacy Digest Tue, 30 Jan 96 Volume 8 : Issue: 010 Today's Topics: Moderator: Leonard P. Levine Re: One Person's War on Junk Mail Re: One Person's War on Junk Mail Re: One Person's War on Junk Mail Re: One Person's War on Junk Mail Re: Medical Records Privacy Re: Voyeur's delight Re: Some Thoughts on Privacy in General Re: Some Thoughts on Privacy in General Re: AOL search warrants and email retention The Internet is Insecure Big Brother is Closing In Warning on Thefts of Laptops Info on CPD [unchanged since 11/22/95] ---------------------------------------------------------------------- From: ajkovar@ix.netcom.com (Adrienne J. Kovar ) Date: 28 Jan 1996 08:11:48 GMT Subject: Re: One Person's War on Junk Mail Organization: Netcom David & Kirsten Lichty wrote: My favorite response is to stuff their postage paid envelope full (really, really full) of all of the stuff they sent me at a postage rate I subsidised. Been there, done that . Now any known junk mail just goes straight from mailbox to circular file. For me, it's no longer worth the time or the aggravation that comes from acknowledging junk mail. Not that I don't value my privacy. FWIW, I have an unlisted phone, and I use checks without my address. I don't tell people things I don't feel they need to know. But it would take a lot to change the way society operates as a whole, and I'm not up to it. I'll leave it to you nice people. :-) -- AJ 8-) ------------------------------ From: "Dennis G. Rears" Date: Mon, 29 Jan 96 11:53:36 EST Subject: Re: One Person's War on Junk Mail David & Kirsten Lichty writes: My favorite response is to stuff their postage paid envelope full (really, really full) of all of the stuff they sent me at a postage rate I subsidised. You have it wrong, the junk mailer subsidizes our first class rates. Junk mail is extremely profitable for the USPS. If junk mail were to disappear completely rates would at least double if not triple. Another trick, I use different middle initials or invent a "dept. no." for various responses. With a little record keeping, I can tell who is selling my name. And with a mini-contract as you described this could become interesting. I use different initials on my magazines subscriptions. I started it in college Other that I just toss out most of the stuff. Since have I both a residential and P.O. Box it get a double dose of junk mail. My credit card bills go to my residential my magazines go to PO box. I get more junk mail at the PO Box. As far as shipping it back in the reply envelopes or suing in small claims court; I am astonished that people have the time to spend doing this. The (supposed) cure is worse than the disease but if it makes people feel better. -- dennis ------------------------------ From: Chris Kocur Date: 29 Jan 1996 20:35:05 GMT Subject: Re: One Person's War on Junk Mail Organization: JCPenney References: fyoung@oxford.net (F Young) wrote: I've never been through a time when I got so upset about junk mail that I would go through the trouble of writing a "contract" such as that of Mr. Beken, or suit the marketer in court. Personally, I'm more upset on fax advertising or the long and windy unsolicited e-mail as it cost me money to receive them. Long e-mails could also potentially fill up my mailbox and cause important messages to get bounced. It all depends on your situation. My email doesn't cost extra and I don't leave my fax online, so those don't bother me as much. But I have had important and wanted mail (bills, magazines, letters) returned as undeliverable because junk mail had filled up my mail box. -- Regards, Chris ------------------------------ From: glr@ripco.com (Glen L. Roberts) Date: 30 Jan 1996 20:57:47 GMT Subject: Re: One Person's War on Junk Mail Organization: Full Disclosure References: Beth Givens wrote: Is this a significant victory? I think so. A court has agreed that a consumer has a right to say "no" to junk mail and to have the request honored. Perhaps this case, along with the Avrahami case, will serve as wake up calls to the direct marketing industry. Consumers want and deserve to be able to control what enters their mailboxes. Your thoughts?? Dan Langille wrote: I think not. I always understood it to be the case that asking not to receive unsolicited material meant the sender must cease. If I am mistaken, the I would agree with you that the case is significant. Otherwise, it's just an example where someone really mucked up and Mr Beken was smart enough to know how to take advantage of what he thought was going to happen. Sexually explicit material aside... one does not have to abide by ANY request to stop sending mail to them. (It might be common sense to stop... but...) What Robert Beken did was get Computer City to enter into a CONTRACT with him not to send him any junk mail. The CONTRACT further specified the damages and Computer City agreed. It made it a simple contract dispute in court. If you send a letter telling one not to mail you and you want $1000.00 if they do... good luck! ------ Links, Downloadable Programs, Catalog, Real Audio & More on Web Full Disclosure [Live] -- Privacy, Surveillance, Technology! (Over 140 weeks on the Air!) The Net Connection -- Listen in Real Audio on the Web! http://pages.ripco.com:8080/~glr/glr.html ------ ------------------------------ From: prvtctzn@aol.com (Prvt Ctzn) Date: 27 Jan 1996 20:25:17 -0500 Subject: Re: Medical Records Privacy Organization: America Online, Inc. (1-800-827-6364) References: If you like, I can tell you were to get a list citizens with the following ailments: Allergies Alzheimers Angina Arthritis Bladder Control Gingivitis Blindness Diabetes Emphasema Epilepsy Heart Desease Baldness Yeast Infections... and more Privacy in the area of our medical contions? It just does not exist thatnks to the power of the direct marketing industry. -- Robert Bulmash Private Citizen, Inc. 1/800-CUT-JUNK ------------------------------ From: rj.mills@pti-us.com (Dick Mills) Date: 28 Jan 1996 18:04:32 -0500 Subject: Re: Voyeur's delight How refreshing. In CPD 09:26 raised a point in the encryption debate I never heard before. While the debate over who should hold the escrowed keys is a legitimate one, I must point out that some form of key escrow is essential as a practical matter in order for electronic documents to be legally binding. I think this more than anything else is why PGP is not much appreciated by the business community. We cannot permit electronic commerce wherein someone can claim "oops, I lost the key...sorry about your $1M". I can see the cause for concern if this is a real hole, but I can't see the hole. Can you elaborate? How can someone perpetrate a fraud by losing a key? Further, persons who really wish to protect their data can layer a better encryption scheme on top of Lotus'. Like the gun lobby, we privacy paranoids don't want to let them get a toe in the door. We believe that the government intends to move to prohibit private encryption as soon as they have Clipper in place. I don't see how there can be any kind of realistic electronic commerce at the international level without the cryptosystem being in the public domain (or at least dirt cheap). I agree about the public part, but you seem to be defending the Clipper proposal in your article. The Clipper algorithm is not public. Cheap is not an issue. Secure encryption is not dependent on secrecy. Public algorithms can be examined to verify that they do not, contain holes back doors such as a secret master key. The government's refusal to make Clipper public raises the suspicion that they have done exactly that, and that the escrow issue is merely a smoke screen. I can't say for sure, but I think this makes it logistically challenging for any government to try to scan all encrypted email traffic with a keyword search, for example. Shotgun scanning is not the only risk. Storage is cheap enough to archive *ALL* the Internet traffic *ALL* the time, in raw unprocessed form. A terabyte tape reel has already been reported. That's enough to store 500 million typical email messages on a single reel. It's not only the government that has the resources to archive the traffic, private parties do it already. In a decade or two a typical home PC may have the capacity to archive all the world's UseNet traffic and web pages. Enemies in hostile countries can also archive our traffic. The archive holder could then select individuals, either in advance, or retroactively to have their encryption broken and examined. Selectivity reduces the cost of surveillance by a factor of 1,000,000 my guess). Retroactivity allows the use of tomorrow's computer power to break today's messages. Civil libertarians should be alarmed because the power of surveillance could be used politically and commercially as well as for law enforcement. As automated toll collectors and surveillance cameras (including facial recognition) become on-line "webcams", then video and audio recordings of all surveiled public areas will become part of the permanent public archives. Future O.J. trials will never again have to speculate who was where when. Last year's furor over the DejaNews service is just a harbinger of things to come. IBM's contemporary TV ad about "data mining" is another. The genie is already out of the bottle. Eventual decryption, indexing and cross referencing of the entire archival record seem a certainty, not a possibility.Your grandchildren will be able to find everything you ever said or did on the electronic record ... A voyeur's delight. -- Dick Mills +1(518)395-5154 AKA dmills@albany.net http://www.albany.net/~dmills ------------------------------ From: stuart@cosc.canterbury.ac.nz Date: 30 Jan 1996 02:05:14 GMT Subject: Re: Some Thoughts on Privacy in General Organization: University of Waikato References: ingramm@Cognos.COM (Mark Ingram) writes: I was first going to attempt to justify this assertion with a vaguely religious argument, you know, God knows everything about you, so there can't really be anything wrong with knowing everything about someone else ... but I was led inescapably to the issue of intent -- of course there's nothing wrong with God knowing everything, because God won't do anything evil with that knowledge! So it's a specious argument. Assuming, of course, a christain-judaic world view, where you have a single God who defines good and evil. [Or a single government who defines right and wrong ?] However, in a truly public (non-private? aprivate? deprived (:-)?) world, there isn't even a problem with intentions (or so I assert). Let us take a worst-case example, or at least one that I know, the stalking issue. Let's say that solely because your address was known, someone hunted you down and killed you. But in a world of no privacy, the killer's location and actions are known, and we can presume that redress will be swift and permanent! Even if the killer's actions were public, if there was no one present to observe and record the events, there would be no record for investigators to trace after the event. If a tree falls in a forest, and there's no one there to listen, it makes no noise. There is another problem with a lack of privacy, that of different standards. Where I grew up, there was a Sun Club (Nudist Camp) next to the local primary school. I think most people would agree that a fence (or thick trees) was necessary between the two fot eh purposes of privacy. -- ``The greatest deception men suffer is from their own opinions.'' stuart@cosc.canterbury.ac.nz syeates@cs.waikato.ac.nz ------------------------------ From: haz1@kimbark.uchicago.edu (Bill H.) Date: 30 Jan 1996 12:47:01 GMT Subject: Re: Some Thoughts on Privacy in General Organization: the usual place References: Mark Ingram wrote: {snip; stalking example: person A uses knowledge of person B to murder person B; society uses knowledge of person A to identify and punish} I submit that *all* supposed invasions of privacy are similar to this example. Person A knows something about person B, and performs action C as a result. If the action is unjustified, person B has redress; and if it is justified, why should person B complain? Therein lies the true need for privacy: Person A knows something about person B, and performs action C, which many people regard as "justified", but person B does not. For example, not too many years ago, if person A knew that person B was a homosexual, person A might kill person, and expect the majority of people to react with tolerance for the murder, if not with outright support. In a more mundane example from 1950s culture, say that person B is employed by person A, and on a blind date between person B, and person A's daughter, they end up sleeping together; person A then fires person B, which at that time is considered by society to be a perfectly acceptable reaction. The purpose of privacy is to protect the few and the powerless against the prejudice of the many and the powerful. Take away privacy, and every personal dislike, religious belief, and social prejudice becomes a ground for action in our everyday affairs. Truth to tell, social tolerance is based in significant part on the ability of a society as a whole to ignore the personal lives and choices of its members. Privacy defines for us what areas of our lives we may judged on, and what areas of others lives it is acceptable for us to judge them on; thus, we do not in the normal course of events have to deal with the spectre of being fired for getting romantically involved with the wrong person, or being murder on account of sexual orientation, or being treated as a social pariah because we owned stock in a company that recently went bankrupt. All of these things can happen, but because the information which would permit someone to act against us for those reasons is considered private, and is not generally known by a person unless we choose to tell him or her about it, such happenings are relatively rare. Some prejudices-- ethnic prejudices in particular-- cannot be so easily discouraged by the protection of privacy, because the information is difficult or impossible to conceal; even in these cases, however, privacy can be an important tool against prejudice. How many people do you know, whose ethnic background might be held against them in some quarters, who have chosen not to reveal their ethnicity on an application form? Do you understand why someone might choose to do that? That, too, is an application of privacy: information which triggers prejudices, but is not genuinely relevant to the matter at hand (for example, job competence), is withheld under the aegis of privacy, unless a legal right to know (or a factual impossibility of concealment, as in a face-to-face interview) applies. Oh, the situation of powerful institutions we know nothing about, knowing a great deal about us, is frightening enough, but let us not be so quick to deceive ourselves about privacy. The real enemy-- the power against which we protect ourselves with the cloak of privacy-- is not powerful corporate interests or governments, but the petty prejudices of ourselves and our peers. "Big Brother" is a threat primarily because Big Brother takes his marching orders from We The People. :-) -- Bill Hazelrig (haz1@kimbark.uchicago.edu) ------------------------------ From: MDDALLARA@msuvx2.memphis.edu Date: 29 Jan 1996 14:15:04 -0600 (CST) Subject: Re: AOL search warrants and email retention Declan McCullagh writes: I find it disturbing that, according to the St. Petersburg Times, AOL keeps email for five days before purging. I read this to mean that contrary to what their customers may expect, AOL intentionally retains email users have tried to delete. Disturbing, yes, but not that recent. I remember reading about AOL's email retention policy a few months ago, when law enforcement agencies first ran into the problem of deleted email. An AOL spokeswoman said that it is the company's policy to comply with subpoenas, and that although it does not keep records from chat rooms, it does keep records of e-mail for five days before they are purged. "We certainly respect and abide by our customers' right to privacy, [...] Service decided to make full copies of all mail passing through *their* system and keep those copies for five days. Every time AOL is in the news, they just reinforce my conviction that I'd rather be castrated with a cheese grater than ever use their network. -- *** FIGHT CENSORSHIP *** BOYCOTT COMPUSERVE *** Mark Dallara | Grad Student | Biomedical Engineer | Florida Gator Available for hire soon. Real soon. Any day now. No, really. Resume, C.V., thesis abstract, and Gator stuff at: http://www.mecca.org/BME/STUDENTS/mdallara.html ------------------------------ From: "Prof. L. P. Levine" Date: 30 Jan 1996 13:08:47 -0600 (CST) Subject: The Internet is Insecure Organization: University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee In a copyrighted article in the San Jose Mercury News Simson Garfunkel reports that a company called First Virtual Holdings has developed a rogue computer program that steals credit card numbers from unsuspecting users. According to the program's authors the it demonstrates that using personal computers to send sensitive financial information over the Internet with encryption may be flawed because there is no way to control the computer on which the encryption program itself is running. The authors point out that the program was not designed to perpetrate credit fraud. Instead, it was developed to prove that encryption alone is not the solution to guaranteeing financial security in the age of networked computers. According to the authors today's software systems can't provide overall protection because they don't start at the keyboard interface. The First Virtual program poses as a screen saver. It constantly monitors the keyboard, waiting for the user to type what appears to be a complete credit card number. When such a number is typed, the program activates, playing sinister music and displaying a window showing the credit card number and an icon for the kind of credit card that is currently being used. "There is no reason why one could not write a program to monitor keystrokes, look for numbers which look like credit card numbers, and send them out over the Internet to some party unknown to the person (entering) the credit card number", said Matt Bishop, a professor of computer security at the University of California, Davis. The First Virtual program differs from an actual program that would be used to attack consumers in four important ways. One, it doesn't install itself automatically, Two, it doesn't run in secret. Three, when it finds things, it doesn't steal them -- that is, send them out over the Internet. Four, it is easy to uninstall. But if an attacker was truly interested in capturing large numbers of credit cards, such a rogue program could be hidden in a popular piece of shareware and distributed on the Internet. The program could lie dormant on people's computers for weeks or months. And the credit card numbers could be transmitted widely on the Internet, further allowing the attacker to escape detection. -- Leonard P. Levine e-mail levine@cs.uwm.edu Professor, Computer Science Office 1-414-229-5170 University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Fax 1-414-229-6958 Box 784, Milwaukee, WI 53201 PGP Public Key: finger llevine@blatz.cs.uwm.edu ------------------------------ From: "James P. Galasyn" Date: 29 Jan 1996 10:41:11 -0800 (PST) Subject: Big Brother is Closing In NJ POLICE INTERNET INVESTIGATION OF MURDER THREATENS PRIVACY Excerpted, Trenton Times, 1/28/96 Police needs vie with privacy The bizarre E.Windsor killing that led to a gay "chat room" on America OnLine (AOL) has underscored how on-line computer discussions & e-mail - thought by many users to be private - are vulnerable to routine criminal investigations. Fairfax Co. VA police assisting in the local investigation of the 1/5 murder of Hesse Unger of Hamilton, obtained a criminal search warrant and descended on America Online's Vienna, Va., headquarters Monday to perform the first such search ever of America Online records. After sifting through electronic information and e-mail all day, officers confiscated dozens of files and turned them over to authorities in New Jersey. East Windsor Detective John Funda said local police received the files Thursday evening, but had not yet examined them. The search of the America Online (AOL) computers has sparked fierce debate on the Internet and given law enforcement agencies food for thought. Although civil and criminal court subpoenas have been served on on-line services in recent years, this week's search warrant has demonstrated law enforcement's ability to reach information some computer users incorrectly thought was confidential. "IN FIVE YEARS, we are going to see police pulling someone's America Online records or Compuserve records" commonly, said David Banisar, an analyst for the Washington-based Electronic Privacy Information Center, 'a watchdog group specializing electronic communication issues. "They are going to have access to very personal, private information," he said. "They will be able to read your messages, find out who you talk to, even what your fetishes might be. And right now, very little of that information is being protected." But law enforcement sources said that to obtain most computer records, investigators will have to seek search warrants under the same standards that now apply to searches of private homes and businesses. Still, police are enthusiastic about the potentially incriminating information stored in computers. "It's an 'area in the future that we'll look at as an avenue to gather information and evidence," said Fairfax County Police Lt. Judi Lukens Torian. "We don't want to overstep our bounds, and this would be used only in necessary cases. But there is a lot of information on those disks that could,be vital to cases." The case that led to the search began Jan. 5 in East Windsor when police found the lime-covered body of Unger, 38, wrapped in a blue plastic tarpaulin in the basement of George Hemenway's Jeffrey Lano home. Hemenway, 39, has confessed to shooting and killing Unger while a 15-year-old Hamilton boy looked on ' prosecutors said. The teenager, whose name is being withheld due to his age, told The Times that he, Unger and Hemenway had met through AOL. The boy said the three computer users often met in an AOL chat room titled "NJ M4M," which is the shorthand title for "New Jersey Men for Men," a gay-themed chat room. CHAT ROOMS allow users with common interests to exchange electronic messages as they sit before their computers, which are connected to the service by modems and phone lines. Two other AOL users - Michelle Benson, 24, of Trenton and Timothy Brown, 24, of Hightstown - became involved in the East Windsor murder case when Hemenway asked them to help remove Unger's body from his basement, prosecutors said. Benson later informed police about the body, and she and Brown have been charged with tampering with evidence. Fairfax County police obtained the AOL search warrant and handed over their information to local investigators, who already had seized the computers of Hemenway, Unger and the teenager, said East Windsor Detective John Funda. A computer expert with the New Jersey State Police Technical Support Unit has begun examining the files stored on the hard drives of those computers, Funda said. "One of the computers we're looking at had a lot of files that were deleted. Someone was deleting like crazy," said Funda, who added that experts often can retrieve files that have been deleted from a hard drive. The combined information from the hard drives and the AOL search may shed light on the motive and planning of the homicide, Funda said. It's possible the hard drives will contain much more information than was turned up with the AOL search, because the on- line provider does not archive chat room conversations, and e-mail sent between members is purged from the AOL system five days after it is read, AOL spokeswoman Pam McGraw said. Unread e-mail is purged from the system after 30 days, the spokeswoman said. ON THE OTHER HAND, computer users can easily choose to save permanent copies of their on-line excursions to their hard drives. Several crime and computer specialists said Thursday that the East Windsor case is the first time they had heard of a homicide victim meeting his attacker on-line. And the unusual case has led investigators into controversial terrain. Appeals courts have not specifically ruled on law enforcement access to such records, but Congress is considering several bills that would try to curb some behavior online, including criminalizing indecentspeech. Banisar, whose group advocates special due process protections before authorities can search on-line users' data, said Monday's search illustrates how people other than the targets can be scrutinized in a cornputer-based criminal probe. Mary J. Culnan, a Georgetown University associate professor and expert on computer privacy laws, said many computer users believe what they write on-line "goes off into the cosmos, never to be seen again. They don't know there is an archives. "We already grapple with the issue of police overstepping its bounds," Culnan added. "With technology today, that becomes even more creepy." McGraw of AOL said it is the company's policy to comply with subpoenas and that the service cooperated fully with this investigation. "We certainly respect and abide by our customers' right to privacy," she said. "But we also are going to follow the law. We have 4.5 million customers - that's the size of a city. When we have some problems, we have to deal with it responsibly." Posted in pol-abuse@igc.apc.org To subscribe, send this message: subscribe pol-abuse To this address: majordomo@igc.apc.org ------------------------------ From: "Prof. L. P. Levine" Date: 28 Jan 1996 11:23:18 -0600 (CST) Subject: Warning on Thefts of Laptops Organization: University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Taken from RISKS-LIST: Risks-Forum Digest Thursday 25 January 1996 Volume 17 : Issue 67 FORUM ON RISKS TO THE PUBLIC IN COMPUTERS AND RELATED SYSTEMS (comp.risks) ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy, Peter G. Neumann, moderator From: "Tom Zmudzinski" Date: 24 Jan 96 11:09:41 EST Subject: Warning on Thefts of Laptops (fwd from Buddy Guynn) The following advisory is being provided by Mr. Buddy Guynn, DMC Montgomery Security Manager. He received the information from the Army Material Command regarding the security of Laptop Computers during travel. 1. The following information is valid not only for laptops but also for other items of value such as briefcases while you are in domestic or international travel status: "Laptop computers have become a premium target for theft throughout Europe. Every international traveler who is anticipating on carrying a laptop computer with them must remain on constant alert as they traverse through all airports. Two methods of theft have already occurred at separate airports and the techniques that were used to steal the laptop computers can occur at any airport. Both methods involved two thieves to carry out the theft. Recently, Brussels Airport security advised that one method involved the use of security x-ray machines. The first thief would precede the traveler through the security check point and then loiter around the area where the carry-on luggage had already been examined. When the traveler places his laptop computer onto the conveyer belt of the x-ray machine, the second thief would step in front of the traveler and set off the metal detector. While the traveler was being delayed, the first thief would remove the traveler's laptop computer from the conveyer belt just after it had gone through the x-ray machine and quickly disappear. The most recent method of theft just occurred at the Frankfurt International Airport, Germany, while the traveler was walking around a crowd of people in the airport terminal. The traveler, who was carrying his laptop computer on his rollbag, was preceded by the first thief. Just as the traveler got around the crowd of people, the first thief stopped abruptly, causing the traveler to stop abruptly. When they stopped momentarily, a second thief, who had been following just behind them, quickly removed the traveler's laptop computer from his rollbag and disappeared in the crowd." 2. All travelers, both international and domestic, are urged to be alert to the above methods used in stealing computers and always be mindful of any abrupt diversions during your travels. Report any losses immediately to authorities. Keep serial numbers, make, and model information of your laptop computers, or of any items of value, separate from the item so you can give precise information to authorities if the items are stolen. 3. Request widest dissemination of this correspondence. ------------------------------ From: "Prof. L. P. Levine" Date: 15 Jan 1996 18:40:39 -0600 (CST) Subject: Info on CPD [unchanged since 11/22/95] Organization: University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee The Computer Privacy Digest is a forum for discussion on the effect of technology on privacy or vice versa. The digest is moderated and gatewayed into the USENET newsgroup comp.society.privacy (Moderated). Submissions should be sent to comp-privacy@uwm.edu and administrative requests to comp-privacy-request@uwm.edu. This digest is a forum with information contributed via Internet eMail. Those who understand the technology also understand the ease of forgery in this very free medium. Statements, therefore, should be taken with a grain of salt and it should be clear that the actual contributor might not be the person whose email address is posted at the top. Any user who openly wishes to post anonymously should inform the moderator at the beginning of the posting. He will comply. If you read this from the comp.society.privacy newsgroup and wish to contribute a message, you should simply post your contribution. As a moderated newsgroup, attempts to post to the group are normally turned into eMail to the submission address below. On the other hand, if you read the digest eMailed to you, you generally need only use the Reply feature of your mailer to contribute. If you do so, it is best to modify the "Subject:" line of your mailing. Contributions to CPD should be submitted, with appropriate, substantive SUBJECT: line, otherwise they may be ignored. They must be relevant, sound, in good taste, objective, cogent, coherent, concise, and nonrepetitious. Diversity is welcome, but not personal attacks. Do not include entire previous messages in responses to them. Include your name & legitimate Internet FROM: address, especially from .UUCP and .BITNET folks. Anonymized mail is not accepted. All contributions considered as personal comments; usual disclaimers apply. All reuses of CPD material should respect stated copyright notices, and should cite the sources explicitly; as a courtesy; publications using CPD material should obtain permission from the contributors. Contributions generally are acknowledged within 24 hours of submission. If selected, they are printed within two or three days. The moderator reserves the right to delete extraneous quoted material. He may change the Subject: line of an article in order to make it easier for the reader to follow a discussion. He will not, however, alter or edit the text except for purely technical reasons. A library of back issues is available on ftp.cs.uwm.edu [129.89.9.18]. Login as "ftp" with password identifying yourid@yoursite. The archives are in the directory "pub/comp-privacy". People with gopher capability can most easily access the library at gopher.cs.uwm.edu. Web browsers will find it at gopher://gopher.cs.uwm.edu. ---------------------------------+----------------------------------------- Leonard P. Levine | Moderator of: Computer Privacy Digest Professor of Computer Science | and comp.society.privacy University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee | Post: comp-privacy@uwm.edu Box 784, Milwaukee WI 53201 | Information: comp-privacy-request@uwm.edu | Gopher: gopher.cs.uwm.edu levine@cs.uwm.edu | Web: gopher://gopher.cs.uwm.edu ---------------------------------+----------------------------------------- ------------------------------ End of Computer Privacy Digest V8 #010 ****************************** .